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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
KELLY JAMES PICCIRILLO, ) Case No. 940356 
Defence 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Supreme Court by 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Amended Information \s ill i tliicr ciiniinai counts, 
to-wit: ( '01 INT i, Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a First Degree Felony; COUNT 
II, Possession of a Controlled Substance with lutein In Disli ilnilc, ;i hrsl IJci-ict Felonv; 
and ( C )l NT III, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. Counts I and 
II alleged that Defender - nt to distribute 
methamphetamine and further alleged that both offenses were enhanced to first degree 
felonies due U\ DefWid;int\ \u\oi conviction of a iirug offense. 
On May 19, 1994, Defendant was found guilty of all three counts niirr JI |in y 
1 
trial. Defendant was sentenced to serve two terms of not less than five years or more than 
life and one term of six months, all to be served concurrently. No fine was imposed. At 
trial, the Court allowed introduction of evidence of Defendant's prior conviction of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 2nd Degree Felony, as part 
of the State's case in chief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in allowing the introduction of evidence of 
Defendant's prior drug conviction as part of the State's case in chief? 
2. Did the Court's error result in the denial of Defendant's right to a fair trial, 
due process, and equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues should be reviewed by the 
appellate court for a clear abuse of discretion. See State v. Morrell 803 P.2d 292 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES ON APPEAL IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Prior to the reading of the Information to the jury at the outset of Defendant's 
trial, counsel for Defendant asked to approach the bench whereupon counsel for Defendant 
objected to the reading of the Information, which included language in Counts I and II that 
the charged offenses were "Defendant's second offense of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)ft. The Court 
went back on the record and indicated that counsel for Defendant would be given a chance 
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to secure a record on Defendant's specific objection at the first recess (T. 54). At the next 
recess, counsel for Defendant renewed his objection on the record in the form of a Motion 
in Limine requesting the court to make no reference to Defendant's prior conviction until 
the jury had returned a verdict on the underlying charges. Counsel for Defendant also 
moved to bifurcate the presentation of the evidence of the underlying charges and the 
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction (T. 56-57). 
At the conclusion of the State's case, prior to resting and in front of the jury, 
the prosecutor offered proof of Defendant's prior conviction by offering State's Exhibit No. 
12 which was a certified copy of the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, 
Order of Probation and Commitment in the case of State of Utah v. Kelly James Piccirillo, 
Case No. 931500375. Counsel for Defendant renewed his objection to the introduction of 
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction. The court overruled the objection and the exhibit 
was received (T. 215-16). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
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Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i) & (ii). 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
Section 58-37-8(l)(b)(i). 
(b) Any person convicted of violating subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
Second Degree Felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a First Degree 
Felony. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 4, 1993, Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony (See State's Trial Exhibit 12). 
On February 10, 1994, Defendant was arrested for Distribution of a Controlled Substance, 
Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia (R. 1). In the Amended Information, Counts I and II were enhanced to First 
Degree Felonies because of Defendant's prior conviction. A jury trial was held May 19, 
1994. At trial, the state presented evidence by way of the testimony of the narcotic's officers 
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involved in the case (T. 66-130, 147-177, 178-186, 189). The testimony of the State 
Criminalist (T. 132-142), and the confidential informant who allegedly purchased a quantity 
of methamphetamine from Defendant in a controlled buy (T. 194-214). 
At the beginning of the trial, the Amended Information, including the language 
referring to the Defendant's prior conviction, was read to the jury in its entirety (T. 54). At 
the conclusion of the State's case, the court received State's Exhibit No. 12 which was a 
certified copy of the Defendant's prior conviction (T. 215-16). The reading of the 
Information and the introduction of the Defendant's prior conviction were over Defendant's 
objection. 
The Defendant's case consisted of the testimony of Defendant's mother who 
testified that the methamphetamine belonged to her and that her son had no knowledge of 
the methamphetamine (T. 219-228). The Defendant also testified that the tape recording 
of the transaction was from an earlier drug deal and that he did not sell methamphetamine 
to the confidential informant on the date alleged (T. 229-235). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Defendant was sentenced 
to serve two concurrent prison terms of five years to life and one concurrent prison term of 
six months (R. 99-102). Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal July 15, 1994 (R. 103). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed error in allowing Defendant's prior conviction to be 
made known to the jury in the reading of the Amended Information and in allowing the 
introduction of Defendant's prior conviction in the form of State's Exhibit 12. The trial 
court's error violated Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and denied Defendant the 
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right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR DRUG CONVICTION. 
Section 58-37-8(l)(b)(i) states as follows: 
(b) Any person convicted of violating subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
Second Degree Felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction of subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a First Degree 
Felony. [Emphasis added.] 
Clearly, the specific language of the statute indicates the intent of the statute 
to penalize a person who is convicted of a drug related offense after a prior conviction of 
a drug offense. A literal interpretation of the statute is that a person is only guilty of a First 
Degree Felony upon second or subsequent conviction. The introduction of any evidence of 
the previous conviction prior to the second or subsequent conviction is governed by the 
Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, excludes evidence which, although relevant, 
is excluded because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining whether or not such 
evidence should be excluded. 
The Defendant's prior conviction was not an element of the offense of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance or Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Distribute. The prior conviction is only relevant for purposes of enhancing the 
6 
subsequent conviction. At trial, counsel for Defendant requested that the Court bifurcate 
the issues and allow the jury to determine the Defendant's guilt or innocence of the 
underlying charges and, if the Defendant was found guilty of the underlying charges, then 
either the jury or the judge, as a trier of fact, would determine whether or not the 
Defendant had been convicted of a previous drug offense for purposes of the enhancement. 
The Court rejected defense counsel's motion. 
The underlying issue presented in this case is what safeguards is the Defendant 
entitled to an order to ensure that he is given a fair trial? Justice Zimmerman suggested the 
necessary safeguards in his concurrence in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). The 
safeguard suggested was that of a two-stage trial. Such a proposal would protect 
Defendant's right to a fair trial while satisfying the State's objective to punish repeat 
offenders. However, such a proposal must be supported by law. Defendant submits that 
it is. 
In State v. Loudermilk, 221 Kan. 157, 557 P.2d 1229 (1976), the Kansas 
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of such procedural safeguards. That court recognized 
the difference between crimes in which a prior conviction is a necessary element and crimes 
in which a prior conviction of the same crime is considered in establishing the penalty to be 
imposed. Id. at 1232. Examples of the former include habitual criminal statutes and 
possession of a firearm by restricted person. In such cases, the Defendant's prior conviction 
places him in a class of individuals which makes certain activity itself illegal. The latter class 
of statutes are designed to enhance the punishment for unrelated misconduct which is not 
an element of the defined crime. 
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Because the alleged prior conviction or misconduct is not an element of the 
underlying offense and is unrelated to the underlying offense, its relevance must be 
questioned. 
Evidence that a person has previously been convicted of the same offense 
appears to have relevance, however, its obvious prejudicial value must be weighed against 
its probative value, under Rule 403. 
In State v. Stewart 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946) the Utah Supreme 
Court drew the distinction between statutes that have a prior offense as a necessary element 
of the substantive offense and those that are unrelated and use unrelated crimes solely to 
impose a greater punishment for the subsequent crime. See Stewart, 110 Utah at 208, 177 
P.2d at 385. In Stewart, the Court ruled that the enhanced penalty provision of the DUI 
statute then in effect fell under the category of enhancement crimes, and ruled that the case 
should be bifurcated. The Court quoted State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 457 (1921) 
setting forth the specific procedural safeguards that should be employed in such a case. 
The information should be divided into two parts. In the first the 
particular offense with which the accused is charged should be set 
forth, and this should be upon the first page of the information and 
signed by the prosecuting officer. In the second part former 
convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second page 
of the information, separable from the first page and signed by the 
prosecuting officer. The entire information should be read to the 
accused and his plea taken in the absence of the jurors. When the jury 
has been impaneled and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that 
part of the information which sets forth the crime for which the 
accused is to be tried. The trial should then proceed in every respect 
as if there were no allegations of former convictions, of which no 
mention should be made in the evidence, or in the remarks of counsel, 
or in the charge of the court. When the jury retire to consider then-
verdict, only the first page of the information, on which the crime 
charged is set out, should be given to them. If they return a verdict of 
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guilty, the second part of the information, in which former convictions 
are alleged, should be read to them without reswearing them, and they 
should be charged to inquire on that issue. Of course, the accused may 
plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no further 
proceedings before or by the jury would be necessary. No reason 
appears why the accused if he should choose, might not submit this 
issue to the court without the jury. 
In this way the well-recognized rights of an accused person will be 
protected, and the principles of justice and our long-established laws 
which have been designed to secure an impartial trial in every criminal 
cause will be recognized, respected, and obeyed. 
110 Utah at 210. 
Defendant submits that the above-described procedure was exactly what was 
suggested by Defendant and rejected by the trial court in the instant case. 
In State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), the defendant was charged with 
the first degree murder of his infant son. The charge alleged that the defendant caused the 
death of his son and alleged as an aggravating circumstance that the defendant had 
previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. 
The Supreme Court, in reversing an order denying Defendant's motion for change of venue, 
directed that the trial proceed upon a bifurcated basis, adopting Justice Zimmerman's 
approach in Bishop supra. The Court instructed that the jury was not initially to be 
presented with mention or evidence of the defendant's prior conviction and that only if the 
defendant was found guilty of the intentional and knowing killing was it to be instructed of 
the prior conviction. Quoting Justice Zimmerman: 
The legitimate interests of the state and the accused can easily be 
accommodated through a bifurcated procedure. When the underlying 
crime is charged, and enhancing circumstance involving other crimes 
or bad acts factually related to the underlying criminal episode are also 
charged for the purpose of increasing the severity of the punishment 
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for the underlying crime, the trial court must divide the trial into 
separate segments. First, evidence regarding the underlying crime 
should be omitted, and the jury should be asked to determine guilt or 
innocence based on that evidence alone. Second, if a guilty verdict is 
returned on the underlying charge, then evidence regarding the 
enhancing circumstances should be heard by the same jury for the 
purpose of determining whether those circumstances have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
776, P.2d at 557. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN INTRODUCING THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS SO PREJUDICIAL AS 
TO DENY DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
The record of the trial court proceedings is devoid of any evidence or 
indication that the state introduced evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction for any 
purpose other than enhancement of the grade of the offenses charged in Counts I and II 
from Second Degree Felonies to First Degree Felonies. There is no evidence from the 
record that either the prosecutor or the judge intended to offer or admit evidence of the 
Defendant's prior conviction under Rules of Evidence 404 or 609. No evidence of the facts 
or circumstances surrounding the Defendant's prior conviction were presented, only the fact 
that he had been convicted. The Defendant's character was never placed in issue nor were 
any of the other exceptions described in Rule 404(b) met by the presentation of the state's 
evidence. Nor can the state take the position that evidence of the Defendant's prior 
conviction was admissible under Rule 609 since the evidence was introduced and admitted 
before the Defendant even took the witness stand. 
Even if it were held that evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction was 
admissible under Rule 404(b), it must also meet the requirements of Rule 403. See State 
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v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1993). In State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant committed 
other crimes was established, not because that evidence is logically 
irrelevant, but because it tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the 
fact-finding process. Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued, "It is 
objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but 
because it has too much.11 1 AJ. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law, §58.2 at 1212 (Tillers Rev. 1983). 
Thus, evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless it tends 
to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced 
for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to 
criminality. 
760 P.2d at 295. 
The court goes on to quote E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, §190 at 565 
(3d Ed. 1984) suggesting the following factors to be evaluated in balancing probativeness vs. 
prejudice: 
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but of classifying and 
then balancing. In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and 
the like substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the 
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities 
between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and 
the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to over 
mastering hostility. 
760 P.2d at 295-96. 
In the instant case, it is very difficult to apply the factors set forth in Shickles 
since there is no evidence of the prior crime, other than evidence of the conviction itself, to 
compare to the charges and factual allegations set forth in Counts I and II. The reason 
there is no such evidence is because the admission of the evidence of the prior conviction 
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was not for the purpose of proving the subsequent crime, but only for the purpose of 
enhancing the subsequent crime. For that very reason, evidence of the prior conviction 
should not have been introduced in the guilt phase of the trial on the subsequent crime. Its 
introduction served no purpose other than to "rouse the jury to over mastering hostility," 
resulting in the denial of the Defendant's right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, it is within the discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence 
pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence when its prejudicial nature outweighs its 
probative value. It is hard to imagine more prejudicial evidence than evidence of a prior 
conviction of exactly the same offense as the Defendant is presently being tried for. The 
prejudicial nature of the introduction of such evidence is further aggravated by the relative 
simplicity of procedural safeguards to prevent such prejudice. Based on the foregoing, it is 
respectfully submitted that Defendant's right to a fair trial and due process were violated by 
the introduction of the evidence of his prior conviction and that the conviction must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this day October, 1994. 
Douglas D. Terry 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of October, 1994, I did personally 
mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document to Jan Graham, Utah 
Attorney General at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Secretary 
12 
